Poland’s Geopolitical Balancing Act
Poland took the geopolitical spotlight Dec. 6 as Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was in Warsaw for an official two-day state visit while the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was in Berlin for the 10th Polish-German intergovernmental consultations. In Warsaw, Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski said at a press conference with Medvedev that Poland would act as a bridge for improved Russian relations with the European Union and NATO. In Berlin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel threw Germany’s support behind the Polish diplomatic initiative known as the Eastern Partnership intended to improve relations with former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Poland is trying to balance the task of improving relations with Moscow and Berlin against maintaining close relations with the United States (Komorowski flies to Washington for talks with U.S. President Barack Obama immediately after his talks with Medvedev) and its own initiative to push back the Russian sphere of influence with the Eastern Partnership. Whether Warsaw can continue its foreign policy balancing act remains to be seen. If it pushes too ambitiously with Eastern Partnership in what Moscow considers its sphere of influence, it may trigger a Russian reaction and German annoyance. How active Poland is in Eastern Europe probably will depend on how much help Washington is willing to provide. We expect Poland to be at the center of activity in the European Union during 2011, the second half of which it will hold the EU presidency. - STRATFOR
A Militant Attack on the Chechen Parliament Building
Chechen militants and suicide bombers launched an armed raid against the Chechen parliament building in Grozny on Oct. 19, killing at least three people and wounding 17. The militants were quickly neutralized by special operations forces within 20 minutes and no lawmakers were harmed, but the fact that they were able to successfully penetrate one of the most secure buildings in Grozny indicates an increase in aggression from recent attacks that have involved one-off improvised explosive device or grenade attacks. The attack is being blamed on Hussein Gakayev, who in August split from the Caucasus Emirate and its leader, Doku Umarov, and was likely intended to serve as an announcement that Grozny is back in the cross-hairs after several years of neglect while Umarov was overseeing militant operations there. - STRATFOR
China’s Prospective 2012 Core Leadership
The Communist Party of China (CPC) holds its Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee from Oct. 15-18. One of the most highly anticipated items on the agenda is the dubbing of Vice President Xi Jinping as a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which will secure him a position as China’s next leader. This appointment, which is likely to take place on the final day of the plenum on Oct. 18, would prepare Xi to take Hu Jintao’s place as core leader of China in 2012 and future chairman of the CMC. Xi’s smooth appointment will be a critical step toward the 2012 generational shift in leadership. In 2012, the CPC’s leaders will retire and a new generation — the so-called fifth generation — will take the helm. The transition will affect the CPC’s most powerful decision-making organs, determining the makeup of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee, and most important, the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee that is the core of political power in China. - STRATFOR
EEZ Border Dispute in the East China Sea
Over the past month, tensions have flared between China and Japan following the Japanese coast guard’s apprehension of a Chinese fishing ship near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands. Japan disputes China’s right to develop the Chunxiao natural gas field, located in the islands’ vicinity, because it claims China will siphon off natural gas resources from within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a designation that, under international maritime law, grants special rights over the exploration and use of maritime resources found within 200 nautical miles of a country’s coast. China has protested the apprehension loudly, canceling diplomatic and business meetings, arresting four Japanese citizens for taking pictures near a military site in China, and signaling that it could take such economic reprisals as unilaterally developing Chunxiao. China also allegedly threatened to stop exports of rare-earth metals, on which Japan depends for its high-tech manufacturing sector. Though Beijing denied doing so, this rumor, coupled with China’s other actions, illustrates China’s economic leverage over Japan. Japan’s release of the last detainee, the ship’s captain, has not led to an immediate detente, but there are signs that the two sides could hold meetings relatively soon to pacify the situation. China and Japan have long had a contentious relationship, and the public outcry in the latest dispute is reminiscent of strains in their relationship from 2003-2006. But China has become increasingly assertive over the past year in dealing with foreign powers, especially in territorial disputes, which has led to concerns in Japan, Southeast Asia and the United States about Beijing’s growing economic and military might. - STRATFOR
Russia’s Dwindling Labour Force
A decline in birth rates shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in fewer students attending Russian universities. There are not enough of them to fuel the country’s modernisation drive.
That trend has led to fewer skilled workers and is now threatening Russia’s economic growth.
U.S. Forces Retake Hijacked Ship
U.S. Marine forces wrested control of a German-owned container ship, the MV Magellan Star, from Somali pirates Sept. 9 in the Gulf of Aden. The operation was the first of its kind for U.S. forces since piracy picked up in the region in 2007. The U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet said the operation does not indicate the beginning of more aggressive action on the part of the international counter-piracy naval forces in the Gulf of Aden, but it does mark the third visit, board, search and seizure raid this year by international forces against ships taken by pirates. The increased frequency of such operations could be attributed to improved situational awareness among international naval forces in the area, which have now had surface assets and aerial and submarine platforms in place for two years. In other words, the raid on the MV Magellan Star does not necessarily indicate a new policy but could represent a maturation of capabilities in the theater. Nevertheless, the scope and scale of Somali pirates’ area of operation — the Gulf of Aden alone is 200,000 square miles — means the relatively small amount of deployed naval assets will continue to be limited in their ability to respond to the piracy threat. - STRATFOR
Afghanistan and the War Legend
By Robert W. Merry
U.S. President Barack Obama’s Aug. 31 Oval Office speech on the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq had many purposes: to claim a measure of credit for largely fulfilling one of his major campaign promises; to thank those who have served and sacrificed in the cause; to spread the balm of unity over any lingering domestic wounds; to assure Americans that it has all been worth it and that no dishonor was attached to this foreign adventure, which was opposed by many in Obama’s own party and by him from the beginning.
Of all those purposes, and any others that might have been conceived, the need to express assurance of the war’s validity — and honor in its outcome — is by far the most important. Any national leader must protect and nurture the legend of any war over which he presides, even those — actually, particularly those — he has brought to a close. The people need to feel that the sacrifice in blood and treasure was worth it, that the mission’s rationale still makes sense, that the nation’s standing and prestige remain intact.
In terms of America, nothing illustrates this more starkly than the Vietnam experience. This was a war that emerged quite naturally out of a foreign policy outlook, “containment,” that had shaped American behavior in the world for nearly two decades and would continue to shape it for another two decades. Hence, one could argue that the Vietnam War was a noble effort entirely consistent with a policy that eventually proved brilliantly successful. But the national pain of defeat in that war spawned an entirely different legend — that it was a huge mistake and a tragic loss of life for no defensible purpose. The impact of that legend upon the national consciousness could be seen for decades — in war-powers battles between the president and Congress, in a halting defense posture often attributed to what was called the “Vietnam Syndrome,” in the lingering civic hostility engendered when the subject emerged among fellow citizens, in the flow of tears shed daily at Washington’s Vietnam Memorial.
So the presidential responsibility for the legend of war is no trivial matter when young Americans begin returning home in body bags. A wise president will keep it well established in his mind in selling a war, in prosecuting it and eventually in explaining it at its conclusion.
This important presidential function posed two particular challenges for Obama during his Oval Office speech: First, his past opposition to the war in Iraq created a danger that he might appear insincere or artificial in his expressions, and second, it isn’t entirely clear that the legend can hold up, that the stated rationale for the war really withstands serious scrutiny. Yes, America did depose Saddam Hussein and his regime. But the broader aims of the war — to establish a stable, pro-Western regime in the country and thus maintain a geopolitical counterweight to the regional ambitions of Iran — remain unfulfilled. The president handled the first challenge with aplomb, hailing the war’s outcome (so far) while avoiding the political schisms that it bred and delivering expressions of appreciation and respect for his erstwhile adversaries on the issue. Whether he succeeds in the second challenge likely will depend upon events in Iraq, where 50,000 American troops remain to support Iraqi security forces and help maintain stability.
But Obama’s effort to preserve the war’s legend, which was ribboned throughout his speech, raises the specter of an even greater challenge of preserving the legend of a different war — the war in Afghanistan, which Obama says will begin to wind down for America in July of next year. It remains a very open question whether events will unfold in that nettlesome conflict in such a way as to allow for a reassuring legend when the troops come home. That open question is particularly stark given the fundamental reality that America is not going to bring about a victory in Afghanistan in any conventional sense. The Taliban insurgency that the United States is trying to subdue with its counterinsurgency effort is not going to go away and, indeed, the Taliban will likely have to be part of any accommodation that can precede America’s withdrawal.
Thus, the Obama administration has become increasingly focused on what some involved in war planning call “the endgame.” By that, they mean essentially a strategy for extricating the country from Afghanistan while preserving a reasonable level of stability in that troubled land; minimizing damage to American interests; and maintaining a credible legend of the war that is reassuring to the American people. That’s a tall order, and it isn’t clear whether the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan, under U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus, can affect the magnitude of the challenge one way or another.
Very quietly, top officials of the Obama administration have initiated a number of reviews inspecting every aspect of this endgame challenge. Some involve influential outside experts with extensive governmental experience in past administrations, and they are working with officials at the highest levels of the government, including the Pentagon. One review group has sent members to Russia for extensive conversations with officials who were involved in the Soviet Union’s ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Others have traveled to Pakistan and other lands, including the United Kingdom, Germany and France, to master the diplomatic implications of any Afghan exit strategy.
It’s too early to determine just what impact these review groups will have on administration thinking, which appears to remain in a state of development. But it can be said that at least some of these outside experts are pressing hard for an endgame approach that moves beyond some earlier thinking about the war and its rationale. For example:
Underlying all this is a strong view that the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force cannot impose an endgame. The Taliban are not going to submit to U.S. blandishments for negotiation as a result of any fear of what will happen to them if they don’t. That’s because they are winning and possess the arms, wiles, knowledge of terrain and people and insurgency skills to keep on winning, irrespective of what Petraeus does to thwart them. Besides, the tribes of Afghanistan have demonstrated through the centuries that they have the patience to outlast any invader.
If the Taliban won’t negotiate out of fear of what the U.S. military can do to them, the question becomes whether they will negotiate out of a sense of opportunity — as a means of bringing about the U.S. exit that American government officials increasingly seem to want as well. There are indications the Taliban might be interested in participating in such a negotiated American exit, perhaps in exchange for some kind of international recognition. At this point, however, there is no firm evidence that such an approach could prove fruitful, and hence this question remains one of the great imponderables hovering over America’s presence in Afghanistan.
But, if that does prove possible, the question of America’s war legend will loom very large indeed. Those involved in the review groups reportedly are well aware that the nature of the U.S. departure will inform the legend, and they are intent on crafting an outcome that will honor America’s Afghanistan war dead and U.S. war veterans. In other words, in this view, there must remain a narrative that explains why America was there, what was accomplished, and why the departure was undertaken when it was. It must resonate throughout the nation and must be credible.
This poses another fundamental question: Is there an inherent inconsistency between the outlook emerging from these governmental review groups and the recent pronouncements of Petraeus? Many of the review-group participants seem to be working toward what might be called a “graceful exit” from Afghanistan. Yet Petraeus told The New York Times on Aug. 15 that he does not see his mission in such small terms as a “graceful exit.” Rather, he said his marching orders were to do “all that is humanly possible to help us achieve our objectives.” By “our objectives,” he seemed to mean establishing, through military force, a sufficient degree of stability in the country to allow a negotiated exit on American terms, with his Iraq record serving as the model. Even if that is possible, it certainly will take considerable time. The general made clear in the Times interview and in others that he fully intended to press Obama hard to delay any serious troop withdrawal from Afghanistan until well beyond the July 2011 time frame put forth by the president.
Thus, the nature and pace of withdrawal becomes another big question hovering over the president’s war strategy. Many high-ranking administration officials, including the president, have said the pace of withdrawal will depend upon “conditions on the ground” when July 2011 arrives. Obama repeated that conditional expression in his Iraq speech the other night. But that leaves a lot of room for maneuver — and a lot of room for debate within the administration. The reason for delaying a full withdrawal would be to try to apply further military pressure to force the Taliban to become less resistant. That goal seems to be what’s animating Petraeus. But others, including some involved in the review groups, don’t see much prospect of that actually happening. Thus, they see no reason for much of a withdrawal delay beyond the president’s July deadline — particularly given the need to preserve the country’s war legend. The danger, as some see it, is that an effort to force an outcome through military action, given the unlikely prospect of that, could increase the chances of a traditional military defeat, much like the one suffered by the Soviets in the 1980s and by the British in two brutal military debacles during the 19th century.
Many of the experts involved in the Afghanistan review effort see a link between the departure of U.S. combat troops from Iraq, as described by Obama in his Oval Office speech, and the imperative to fashion an Afghanistan exit that offers a war legend at least as comforting to the American people. Certainly, the importance of the war legend was manifest in Obama’s Iraq speech. First, he repeatedly praised the valor and commitment of America’s men and women in uniform. Even in turning to the need to fix the country’s economic difficulties, he invoked these U.S. military personnel again by saying “we must tackle those challenges at home with as much energy, and grit, and sense of common purpose as our men and women in uniform who have served abroad.” He expressed a resolve to honor their commitment by serving “our veterans as well as they have served us” through the Department of Veterans Affairs, emphasizing medical care and the G.I. Bill. And he drew an evocative word picture of America’s final combat brigade in Iraq — the Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade — journeying toward Kuwait on their way home in the predawn darkness. Many Americans will recall some of these young men, extending themselves from the backs of convoy trucks and yelling into television cameras and lights, “We won! We’re going home! We won the war!”
But, as Obama noted in his speech, this is “an age without surrender ceremonies.” It’s also an age without victory parades. As he said, “we must earn victory through the success of our partners and the strength of our own nation.” That’s a bit vague, though, and that’s why Obama’s speech laid out the elements of the Iraq success in terms that seemed pretty much identical to what George W. Bush would have said. We succeeded in toppling Saddam Hussein. We nurtured an Iraqi effort to craft a democratic structure. After considerable bloodshed, we managed to foster a reasonable amount of civic stability in the country so the Iraqi people can continue their halting pursuit of their own destiny. Thus, said the president, “This completes a transition to Iraqi responsibility for their own security.” He added, “Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the United States and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it’s time to turn the page.”
That’s probably enough of a legend to fortify the good feelings of those young men yelling of victory from the backs of Stryker Brigade vehicles on the way out of Iraq. But getting to even that degree of a war legend in Afghanistan will be far more difficult. And, as the endgame looms in that distant land, the administration will have to grapple not only with how to prosecute the war and foster a safe exit but also with how to preserve a suitable legend for that war once the shooting stops.
Afghanistan and the War Legend is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
So, our President is vowing to find new ways to stimulate our economy and his latest idea is to rebuild our transportation infrastructure. It would cost at least $50 billion, and would include the nation’s roads, railways, and airports. Honestly, if it costs $50 billion, why not invest that towards a high-speed rail system that can 1) create a faster connection between the West and East, 2) eco-friendly, 3) would definitely keep people employed because it takes a long time to create such a system, 4) decrease # of cars on the road. Europe and East Asia already have high-speed rails, why not us?
Turkmenistan possesses some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves and prior to 2009 produced around 75 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. But in 2009, the pipeline system transporting the majority of Turkmenistan’s natural gas to Russia ruptured. After the pipeline was repaired, Russia only accepted natural gas at a rate of 10 bcm for 2010 — compared to 50 bcm in 2009 — because Russia was experiencing a glut from its own high levels of production. Turkmenistan has diversified by increasing exports to Iran and China by 12 and 5 bcm per year, respectively. However, Turkmenistan’s exports are still down by more than 50 percent. Turkmenistan may be able to increase exports to China to 30 bcm per year, but it must compete with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and settle on a price with Beijing, which has been a sticking point for both sides. Turkmenistan’s land-locked geographic position makes it necessary for the country to strike challenging strategic bargains with its energy-consuming neighbors in order to leverage its natural gas resources. - STRATFOR
Turkey’s Influence in the Balkans
Turkish President Abdullah Gul will visit Bosnia-Herzegovina from Sept. 2-3 as tensions rise in the country ahead of October general elections. Turkey has used precisely this instability to enhance its position as a mediator to the region. The goal for Turkey is to show Europe that without Turkish involvement there will be no resolution to the Balkan security problems. However, Turkey has to walk a thin line between anchoring its influence among the Muslim populations of the Balkans and presenting itself as a fair arbiter between all sides, while also taking care to manage its image in the West, where it has recently been criticized for relying too much on its Islamic credentials for leadership. - STRATFOR
The modern nation-state of Iraq, since its inception in 1921, has had to deal with a triangular ethno-sectarian power struggle between the country’s three principal communal groups: Shia, Sunnis and Kurds, largely gathered in the southern, central and northern parts of the country, respectively. Until the U.S. move to effect regime change in Baghdad, these ethno-sectarian cleavages were by and large kept in check by a military-led state dominated by the country’s Sunni minority. After the fall of the Baathist government in 2003 and the American move to dismantle the country’s military establishment, Washington has been struggling to restore an ethno-sectarian balance of power in the country — with little success. A key impediment to the U.S. strategy has been the disproportionate amount of influence enjoyed by Iran among the country’s Shiite, Kurdish and even Sunni communities. This dilemma becomes even more magnified as the United States is in the process of a military drawdown and exit from Iraq, especially with the lack of a power-sharing agreement entailing a significant Sunni presence that can serve as a bulwark against Iranian ambitions to project power in the region. The outcome of this struggle remains unclear, but the bulk of Iraqi history, where its Sunni minority dominated the state, appears to be unlikely to be repeated any time soon. - STRATFOR
WHY are Americans getting fatter and fatter? The simple explanation is that we eat too much junk food and spend too much time in front of screens — be they television, phone or computer — to burn off all those empty calories.
Unfortunately, behavior changes won’t work on their own without seismic societal shifts, health experts say, because eating too much and exercising too little are merely symptoms of a much larger malady. The real problem is a landscape littered with inexpensive fast-food meals; saturation advertising for fatty, sugary products; inner cities that lack supermarkets; and unhealthy, high-stress workplaces.
In other words: it’s the environment, stupid.
The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and the world’s oceans. The navigable waters at the Strait’s most narrow point are roughly 20 miles wide. Commercial and naval maritime traffic — including around 17 million barrels of crude oil aboard some 15 tankers per day — transits two designated shipping lanes inside Omani waters. Each lane (one into the Gulf, one out) is two miles wide and is separated by a two mile-wide buffer. As the primary sea route to Iraq and a key transportation corridor for global energy supplies, the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to both American military and global economic interests is difficult to overstate. Consequently, Iran’s ability to attempt to disrupt traffic through the Strait is a significant threat, especially because even ineffective attempts at disruption can send oil markets tumbling. - STRATFOR